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1.  Introduction 
While mismanagement and bad governance at the macro or state level is widely regarded as a 
leading explanation for African underdevelopment (e.g., Herbst 2000), little economic literature 
focuses on the role of management of development projects at the local level.  This is unfortunate 
because the capacity of central states to intervene in local matters is often limited, and lower tiers 
of government—predominantly chiefs—have considerable autonomy in issues of economic 
importance.  These include taxation, the allocation of resources (including land), and the 
operation of the front line of the judicial system (e.g., Mokuwa et al. 2011).  The quality of local 
governance may affect investment behavior of villagers, and shape local development trajectories 
(Beekman et al. 2013, 2014).  The scant evidence that exists to describe the quality of lower-tier 
management in Africa suggests chiefs are unaccountable “despots” (e.g., Mamdani 1996; 
Acemoglu et al. 2013). Indeed, colonial systems of indirect rule, where elites received formal 
authority from the colonial government, allowed chiefs to avoid accountability to their local 
constituencies (Boone 2003), facilitating the appropriation of communal resources.  For analyses 
of the persistence of (de facto) elite power, via systems of clientelism or otherwise, refer to 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) or Anderson et al. (2015). 
The issue of management at the local level has gained import in recent years because of 
the increasing popularity among donors and development agencies of so-called Participatory 
Development Projects (PDPs).  PDPs include Community Driven Development (CDD) initiatives 
that encourage local responsibility for service delivery or resource management, as well as efforts 
to decentralize authority and resources to local formal and informal institutions, while at the same 
time improving the representativeness, inclusiveness, accountability and effectiveness of those 
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institutions.  The popularity of such efforts increased after donors learned that states often failed 
to provide the resources necessary for development (Bardhan 2002), and that aid sometimes 
vanished at high rates before reaching targeted recipients (Olken 2006; Reinikka and Svensson 
2004).  Participatory projects were also seen as creating more “sustainable” development as they 
were expected to empower local actors (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009), and produce 
interventions that are better aligned with local priorities, ambitions, and constraints.  In the last 
ten years, the World Bank alone has invested USD 85 billion in participatory approaches 
(Mansuri and Rao 2012).  The World Bank wants to put “poor people at the center of service 
provision: by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice 
in policy-making, and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor” (World 
Bank 2004).  Such efforts put tremendous resources in the hands of project managers often with 
limited experience.  Managing large sums of money, with no formal training, scant 
accountability, and divergent constituencies is challenging. Oftentimes these initiatives explicitly 
empower social groups outside the traditional power structure as a way of limiting elite capture 
and increasing sustainability. This could potentially exacerbate management as experience may 
be lower than that of local elites. 
While participatory development initially seemed to increase the efficacy of aid (e.g., 
Haddinott et al. 2001; Dongier et al. 2003), critics soon emerged (see, e.g., Mansuri and Rao 
2004; Platteau 2004).  A clear theoretical basis is absent for expecting more efficient and 
equitable outcomes (Abraham and Platteau 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; 2005; 2006a).  
One prominent reason is the potentially predatory behavior of local elites, which may invite 
inefficiencies, inequitable distribution, and regressive instead of pro-poor targeting (Baird et al. 
2013).  Evidence is emerging on three potentially problematic dimensions of PDPs in particular: 
(i) the mechanism for project selection, (ii) leakage and elite capture, and (iii) leadership ability 
and the coordination of collective action to implement any particular project.  An overarching 
concern is that local elites are able to “capture” participatory development interventions, and 
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convert resources intended for communal development or set aside for disenfranchised social 
groups into private gains for themselves (Bardhan 2002; Guggerty and Kremer 2008). 
This paper seeks to bridge the economic literatures on local level governance (including 
the role of chiefs) and the efficacy of participatory development interventions.  We have two 
main objectives.  First, to examine the extent of input diversion in the management of a 
participatory development intervention in Sierra Leone.  Akin to the pioneering work of Beath et 
al. (2013), we seek to compare diversion of project resources by the elite versus that of a 
committee of villagers.1  Second, we explore whether alternative governance modalities—
bypassing local elites—may be more effective in promoting local development than channeling 
aid resources via the chief.  We focus on project management rather than project selection, 
complementing work by Olken (2010), Labonne and Chase (2009), and Beath et al. (2017).   
As an auxiliary objective, we also probe whether the impact of PDPs varies 
systematically across receiving villages.  Specifically, we examine the hypothesis that chief 
power is a factor that explains differences in project performance.  Writing about efforts by 
NGOs to bypass public institutions, Uvin (2008, p.117) writes “parallel structures of decision-
making and resource allocation are perceived as threatening by local (…) government: 
uncontrolled by them, in charge of major resources, duplicative of public structures, they are 
typically resented, sabotaged, undermined…”.  If the traditional hierarchy feels threatened by a 
new management regime, perhaps because it complicates the diversion of project resources, then 
local elites may try to undermine the committee's efforts to manage the project, signaling to 
villagers and NGOs that future projects should again be implemented via the elite (Labonte 
2012).  More powerful local elites may be better able to successfully undermine PDP initiatives. 
To explore these issues, we conducted a field experiment in rural Sierra Leone in which 
we varied the management structure associated with a PDP.  Specifically, in a random subsample 
                                                        
1 For cross-country studies of (fiscal and political) decentralization and levels of corruption, refer to Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Fan 
et al. (2009). 
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of villages the traditional elite, including the chief, were made responsible for project 
management.  In other villages, responsibility for project management was delegated to a 
committee of randomly selected villagers. While our study design does not allow us to fully test 
the so-called “chief as a despot” thesis (see below), a comparison of the performance of the PDP 
intervention across the two types of villages speaks to the issue of how project governance and 
the identity of the manager affects both the performance of PDPs and the diversion of project 
inputs.  Our design is unique in that (unlike other studies) we allow the selection of the committee 
to be free from the influence of local elites. This allows for a juxtaposition of the elite’s 
management performance with a more neutral comparison group.  
 
2.  Theory: Participatory Development  
Participatory development projects are now commonly implemented in countries that lack a 
stable central state government or adequate institutions capable of reaching communities in the 
“hinterland”. PDPs have in common that they try to side-step central levels of government, but 
may diverge in the degree to which they involve local representatives of the state. While PDPs 
typically seek to make local governance more transparent, inclusive, and democratic, by 
empowering marginalized social groups, in practice they often rely on cooperation with village 
chiefs (which is not surprising, if the aim is to achieve “scale” with these sorts of interventions). 
Recent empirical evidence casts doubt on the ability of PDPs to promote sustainable and 
equitable development.   
Two recent large-scale and rigorous evaluation studies, one conducted in Sierra Leone 
and the other in the Democratic Republic of Congo, have quantified the impact of community-
driven development efforts on a range of indicators (Humphreys et al. 2015, Casey et al. 2012).  
In both studies, new institutions were created and supported at the local level—village councils 
through which considerable resources were channeled.  Both studies report similar results: the 
interventions achieved little in terms of improved local governance, social cohesion, or welfare.  
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Therefore, it seems difficult to create a set of effective parallel institutions in a context with pre-
existing traditional hierarchies.   
 We identify several reasons why PDPs may fail to reach their stated objectives.  Giving 
more control to communities over project selection potentially entails significant benefits.  Locals 
have better information about their own needs and consequently selected projects may be better 
suited to local conditions.  For example, some evidence suggests that communities can 
successfully identify the poor who most deserve to be program beneficiaries (Alatas et al. 2012; 
Galasso and Ravallion 2005).  People also have the benefit of feeling empowered, which may be 
an end in-and-of-itself, even if indicators of program outcomes are unaffected (e.g., Beath et al. 
2013; Olken 2010; see Dal Bo et al. 2010 for evidence from the lab). There are risks in allowing 
communities control over project selection, however.  If there is disagreement on development 
priorities a voting mechanism may be used, leaving the potential for disenfranchisement among 
minority members of the community (Foster and Rosenzweig 2004).  High-status people may 
force others to choose their preferred project at the expense of those most in need of the project.2  
Such problems may be particularly pressing in settings where leaders are not accountable to their 
constituency. 
Problems associated with the control of project resources may also emerge.  It is 
generally assumed that accountability increases when project management occurs locally, where 
the intended beneficiaries frequently interact with managers (e.g. Fisman and Gatti 2002).  
However, competence of managers also matters.  Moreover, when responsibility for project 
implementation is given to the local community, resources are placed within the control of people 
who typically are severely resource constrained, facing the obvious utilitarian motive to divert 
some of these resources for private consumption or for investing in pre-existing patron-client 
networks (see Chhotray 2004; Platteau and Abraham 2010).  While this can be counteracted 
                                                        
2 A perhaps paternalistic concern is that communities may not know the best strategies for development, or lack self-control or 
political will to implement these. In such case, top-down project implementation could lead to greater gains in welfare. 
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somewhat with greater transparency (e.g., Ferraz et al. 2012; Reinikka and Svensson 2003) or 
accountability to outside authority (e.g., Olken 2007; Platteau and Gaspart 2003a; 2003b), elite 
capture in development projects remains a central concern in the literature (e.g., Burgess et al. 
2012; Caridad Araujo et al. 2008; Das Gupta and Beard 2007; Fritzen 2007; Kundu 2011; and 
Takasaki 2011).  Comparing embezzlement by customary leaders and elected councils, Beath et 
al. (2013) obtain a nuanced set of results.  While elected councils may improve the quality of 
local governance (presumably because of the selection of better candidates), overlapping 
mandates between newly created councils and customary leaders create a common pool problem 
that may foster rent seeking. 
Finally, we can consider problems at the implementation stage of PDPs.  Insofar as 
communities reap the full benefits of their success (and incur the cost of failures), PDPs may 
eliminate the divergent incentives characteristic of complex principle-agent problems.  However, 
transferring responsibility for project implementation to local communities introduces other risks 
and may, for example, aggravate problems of collective action. Perverse incentives to free ride on 
contributions of others exist in most societies.  Community monitoring efforts might address this 
issue, but it is not always evident that people connected in social networks ––playing a repeated 
game––are willing to punish each other.  It is therefore not surprising that efforts to increase 
community monitoring have shown disappointing or mixed results (Banerjee et al. 2008; 
Bjorkman and Svensson 2009; Duflo et al. 2012, Olken 2007). 
Below we compare the performance of chiefs and ordinary villagers in managing a 
community project. To guide our thinking, we developed a simple theoretical model where either 
a (selfish) chief or a committee of villagers is charged with the responsibility of managing a 
development project. The model is included in the on-line Appendix. Performance depends on the 
share of inputs diverted (corruption), costly managerial effort, and a manager-specific production 
function. Moreover, the chief can devote effort to sabotage the project in case a committee of 
villagers is selected to manage the project (to increase the likelihood that he will be selected in 
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the future period). While the performance of the chief and committee depends on functional 
forms and cannot be ranked, the model produces the following testable predictions: more 
powerful chiefs will (i) divert more project resources and (ii) work harder to undermine the 
performance of the committee (sabotage). Our experiment allows us to both test the empirical 
matter of relative performance, as well as these model predictions. 
 
3.  The Study Region: Rural Sierra Leone  
We conduct a field experiment in rural Sierra Leone to explore the impacts of alternative local 
management structures on the implementation of a PDP.  The study country is particularly 
illustrative for such an investigation. Sierra Leone is recovering from a civil war that lasted for 
more than a decade.  The timing of the war was associated with a large increase in aid flows that 
have remained high after the war ended in 2002. In 2011, Sierra Leone received aid worth USD 
71 per capita, placing it sixty-sixth out of 138 recipient countries (CIA Factbook 2014).  
Notwithstanding this international support effort, Sierra Leone continues to score low in terms of 
conventional development indicators.   For example, its Human Development Index score places 
it 181st out of 186 countries (UNDP 2015), and life expectancy in Sierra Leone in 2013 is 57 
years, 199th out of 223 countries (CIA Factbook 2014).  
The field experiment takes place in villages in rural eastern Sierra Leone, governed by 
traditional institutions and dominated by local elites—a chief, a council of elders, a women’s 
leader, a youth leader, a village imam, etc.  Sierra Leone has been characterized as a ranked 
lineage society, where local elites (referred to as “Taa Gbakoi” in the local Mende language) 
control access to land, labor and marriage (Richards 2005).   This hierarchical feature coupled 
with the polygamous nature of these societies is conducive to the clustering of power in the hands 
of a small number of ruling families.  A recurring theme in the literature on Sierra Leone is that 
the exploitative behavior of local elites caused widespread grievances, especially among 
disenfranchised rural youths with little stake in development, possibly contributing to the start of 
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the war (e.g., Richards 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Mokuwa et al. 2011; Labonte 
2012).3   
Sierra Leone has a multi-layer chief system that runs in parallel to the formal state 
apparatus.  The country consists of 149 chiefdoms, governed by a so-called paramount chief from 
a hereditary “ruling house.”  Only individuals from “established” families, recognized and 
appointed by the British colonial ruler in the late 19th century, are eligible to run for the 
chieftaincy even today.  Acemoglu et al. (2013) use the number of ruling houses at the chiefdom 
level (i.e. the number of potential challengers for the chieftaincy) as a proxy for the power of the 
paramount chief.  They hypothesize that a greater number of potential challengers will induce a 
chief to distribute chiefdom resources more widely to garner the support necessary to stay in 
office, diluting the concentration of power.  Their main result is that more powerful chiefs 
provide fewer public goods, and have significantly worse development outcomes.   
This finding supports the “chief as despot” perspective, and complements the dismal 
picture that other authors have painted of the undemocratic and grabbing nature of the public 
sector in Sierra Leone (e.g., Reno 1995).4  In contrast, ethnic divisions do not appear to be a 
factor contributing to underdevelopment or under-provision of public goods (Glennerster et al. 
2013). 
Each chiefdom consists of sections, which in turn consist of villages.  These villages are 
governed by a lower-tier chief, called the village or town chief.  This village chief is the focus of 
our analysis, complementing the perspective on chiefdom-level governance in Acemoglu et al. 
(2013).  Unlike the paramount chief, who is elected by a council, village chiefs are elected by 
taxpaying villagers, from a pool of native families.  The village chief’s main responsibilities 
include settling disputes, organizing public goods (e.g., farming on a communal plot or                                                         
3 Note we do not explicitly study heterogeneous impacts of conflict on the success of the program as we did not collect data on conflict 
events as part of this study. Nearly all villages in the research area have been exposed to conflict. In a survey implemented the same 
area villages were asked about war exposure during the conflict 44%% of villages reported having been attacked at least once with an 
average 28 deaths (or about 7% of the population), see Grijspaarde et al (2013).   
4 The results of Acemoglu et al. (2013) extend beyond the finding that more powerful chiefs provide less public goods (presumably 
because of greater diversion of resources). Chiefs are also able to engineer or structure institutions and civil society at the local level to 
enhance and cement their grip on the lives of their underlings via patron-client networks.  
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plantation, and promoting village cleanliness), and lobbying organizations that could be potential 
donors to bring resources into the village.  The chief, perhaps together with supporting local 
elites, traditionally manage public good provision of the sort intended by donors who implement 
PDPs.   
Village chiefs are accountable to their village. If a majority of the taxpaying population is 
unsatisfied with their chief, they can try to remove him through higher-up layers in the traditional 
leadership system (specifically, through the Section Chief and Chiefdom Committee—see 
Labonte 2012).5  There are limits to the democratic nature of local governance, however.  As with 
the election of paramount chiefs, not all villagers are eligible for the position of village chief. 
Candidates should be from a “chiefly family” (Labonte 2012), which in the context of Eastern 
Sierra Leone implies that only representatives of local landowning and tax-paying families can be 
considered.  This excludes a significant fraction of the population (in our data the percentage of 
households that can ‘produce’ a chief varies from 13% to 100%).  Non-natives, termed 
“strangers”, normally cannot run for chief (but exceptions exist). Strangers are villagers who 
joined the community after the available land had been allocated to founding or ruling families. 
They are relegated to a dependent position in the community, and many have been in that position 
for several generations. 
The divide between landowning families and strangers contributes to the feudal character 
of some of these communities (as described, for example, in Mokuwa et al. 2011).  The share of 
strangers in local communities varies, but they represent the majority in some villages (in our data 
they represent between 0% and 56% of all households). Unfortunately, we lack data on the 
number of households that are of a chiefly family in their village for the full sample of villages 
included in our study. In what follows, we use variation in the number (share) of non-stranger,                                                         
5 Villagers may also try to discipline their village chief through the organs of the “secret society” in the village. Secret societies are 
civic clubs that meet regularly in the (sacred) bush to discuss clan business, but details about such meetings are hardly available as 
members are bound by an oath of secrecy (e.g., Richards 1996). There are separate societies for females and males (Poro) and 
villagers may be initiated into the societies when they reach (young) adulthood. There is anecdotal evidence that sanctioning the chief 
for favoring one family or canonical clan over others may be negotiated in secret societies. 
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native families as a practical measure to identify an exogenous component of the power of village 
elites: in villages with more natives, ceteris paribus, the chief is more likely to be challenged (but 
see Besley and Kudamatsu 2007 and Svolik 2008 for richer treatments of leader turnover in 
autocratic contexts).6  As a robustness analysis we rely on a subset of villages for which we do 
have data on households that are eligible to become chief (from data collected at baseline in 34 of 
the 56 villages). The two proxies of chief power, i.e., the number of non-stranger families and 
chiefly families, have a strong and positive correlation. Our empirical results are largely 
consistent using this alternative proxy (see Table A6a and A6b in the Appendix).   
 
4.  Data and Experimental Design 
4.1 The Experiment 
We report the results of a field experiment conducted in 56 rural villages surrounding the Gola 
Rainforest National Park (GRNP) in southeastern Sierra Leone.  The GRNP is one of the largest 
and last remnants of the Upper Guinea forest in West Africa, and a global biodiversity hotspot.  
Local populations depend to a large extent on agriculture and forest-related goods and services.  
The GRNP is managed by a locally established NGO, the Gola Rain Forest National Park 
Program. In exchange for restrictions on hunting, logging, and mining rights within park 
boundaries, community close to the GRNP boundary received a once-off transfer of on average 
1.8 million Leones (or USD 437) worth of “livelihood support” to be invested in either a 
communal construction or agricultural project.7  The villages eligible for the grant all lie within a 
one mile band around the forest edge. This implies that in some case the villages were very                                                         
6 Chief power depends on various factors, including the goodwill he has accumulated during his period in office. The level of 
competition for the position is one exogenous measure of power. Another is the extent to which the chief is “backed” by higher layers 
of the administrative system – for example via family relationships. Often villages share links with one or multiple of the ruling 
families at the Chiefdom level. We interviewed all ruling families mentioned in the Acemoglu et al (2014) data set for the six 
chiefdoms of our study region. We asked if they shared a family bond with any of the villages in our sample. We find that for two 
villages they state to hold a family relationship the village Chief directly, potentially providing such backing. Comparing the mean 
values in our outcome variables we find no clear difference with other villages in our sample. 
7 Total grant value varied from $160 to $571 per village. GDP PC in Sierra Leone in 2011 stood at an average of $374 (World Bank 
2013). This is likely much lower in rural areas (for example poverty headcount in Kenema district was 62% in 2011). The grant is 
valued at central market prices in Kenema. This implies that the total value of the project in each village is substantially higher as the 
NGO took care of the transportation costs, which constitute a significant amount in these remote areas.  
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remote (comprising over a day’s walk from a motorable road). Although the GRNP had been 
working in the area since 1990, this is the first time they had given grants directly to communities 
in participatory processes. Some villages, consisting of less than 30 households, received a 
smaller grant, so we control for the size of the grant in our empirical work below.  The program 
implementation by GRNP Program then experimentally varied the local governance regime 
associated with the management of the grant.   
We implemented our study from 2010-2012.  During the first visit to each village 
(summer 2010), a community meeting was held in which members of our research team and 
representatives of the GRNP Program explained the grant.  Village members then selected in an 
open discussion and voting process a project they wanted to implement.  Nearly all villages (over 
85% on average, see Table 1, Panel A) chose a construction project, such as a latrine, guesthouse, 
mosque or “barri” (i.e. community meeting space).8  Importantly, this project selection village 
meeting occurred before we randomly determined who would steward the grant; thus, our 
analysis does not capture the impact of variations in how projects are selected because the 
selection mechanism and the management regime are orthogonal by design.9  
Following the vote, the village was randomly assigned to one of two possible governance 
regimes for management and implementation.  In our “committee” villages, we selected a three-
member panel by drawing names of household heads out of a bag.  While we allowed people to 
decline appointment as committee members, no one did.  We chose three committee members, 
rather than one member, to reduce variation in management ability across villages.  We did not 
want the results of the experiment to be driven by the random selection of particularly weak 
managers in “committee” villages (e.g., “the village drunk” managing the project).   
                                                        
8 All construction projects place a similar demand on labor and other resources. Note also that none of these projects is 
overrepresented in either treatment arm. The remaining villages (8 out of 56) chose an agricultural or animal restocking project.  
9 When selecting the project, we assume villagers would have viewed the selection process as nothing other than a typical 
participatory consultation by the NGO, assuming that the chief would manage whatever project they selected. It is possible that, had 
some villages known the chief would not be managing the project, they would have selected a different project. We feel this is 
unlikely, however, as the set of possible projects is small and there seemed to be widespread consensus in village meetings on what 
the village needed. 
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We realize random selection is an extreme form of purging elite involvement from 
project management, and do not necessarily propose this as a model for future development 
interventions (see Beath et al. (2013), and others, on experimental work involving the election of 
council members).  Our design uses random selection of committee members because it was 
designed to limit, as much as possible, the ability of elites to capture the process. If villagers were 
asked to vote to choose project managers, they may have felt pressure to select the chief or his 
proxies (Uvin 2008). This would leave room for the chief to appropriate aid resources via his 
influence on these proxies. Hence, our experimental set-up intended to neutralize these effects.10 
We recognize that this design precludes villagers from choosing the most intrinsically motivated 
or most capable citizen candidates. In that sense, our assessment of the performance may provide 
a lower bound of what committees of villagers could accomplish.   
Our control group consists of “chief” villages, wherein the chief, women’s leader, and 
youth leader were responsible for project management.  This ‘co-opting’ of village elites 
resembles the traditional way of handing over aid projects to villages, but we have chosen to 
delegate responsibility to three elite members, rather than to the chief alone, to ensure that the 
number of project managers would not be a confounding factor when identifying treatment 
effects.  Note that a management council consisting of three members of the local elite, rather 
than just the chief, may introduce additional scrutiny and could invite “better behavior” by the 
chief. That is, perhaps the three elite members together behave more in accordance with 
community preferences than the chief alone would have done. While it is an open question to 
what extent the “elite council” represents an institution that disciplines the chief, we acknowledge 
that behavior of the elite in our experiment may be better than behavior of a single elite member 
                                                        
10 At the same time, out design resonate with many real social contexts where societies are highly hierarchical and where the process 
of choosing a community committee would not be free from the influence of the local elites (for example, most of the people on 
Village Development Committees discussed in Casey et al (2012) are village elites). Here such influences are absent, generating a 
comparison group that was selected independently of the chief’s preferences. 
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as manager. In that sense, our data provide an upper bound of the quality of governance offered 
by (unconstrained) chiefs.11  
Table 1 summarizes our experimental data, for the “chief” and “committee” villages 
separately. We report descriptive statistics as well as a test for the equality of means for a set of 
variables collected in our subsample of 34 baseline villages and for some time-invariant variables 
included in our full endline survey collected in 56 villages (Panel B and C). Randomization of the 
experimental design was successful: “chief” and “committee” villages are balanced across 
observable characteristics including the size of the grant, and the type of the project selected. Of 
course, we realize that for some variables the number of observations is small, so that the power 
of the associated t-test is low.  
Comparing the chiefs and villager councils (Panel D and E) there are obvious differences.  
Specifically, elite managers are on average older and less likely to originate from a stranger 
family. Controlling for these differences does not affect our results.12 Importantly, elite members 
are not different in other human capital variables. Such differences would have provided an 
alternative mechanism to explain our empirical results discussed below: differences in 
performance between the elite and villager committee would be explained by differences in 
managerial capacity rather than (abuse of) power and input diversion.  While we lack detailed 
data on management ability (such as education, cognitive skills, etc.) for the full sample of 
villages, we do observe that chief and villager committees are similar along two important 
observables: gender and income (proxied by farmsize) – see Table 1 (Panel D). We also do not 
find significant differences when comparing single chiefs to ordinary villagers in the committee 
(Panel E).  In addition, we do not find differences in age, gender and income between strangers 
and non-strangers in the committee (Panel F).                                                         
11 To probe the degree to which the interests of the members of the elite council were aligned, we collected the names of all council 
members. A simple comparison reveals that in about half of the councils (14/30) the chief shares the same last name with at least one 
of his fellow elite council members. While having the same family name does not necessarily indicate that elite members are family 
related, or that their interests are necessarily perfectly aligned, this is clearly a realistic possibility. 
12 See Appendix Table A4a and Table A4b. It is interesting to observe that “strangers” are not missing from the elite group altogether 
(see Table 1). While there are no stranger chiefs, strangers are included in the samples of women leaders and youth leaders.  
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We have collected more detailed data to probe the robustness of this result. First, consider 
the cognitive ability of sub-samples of chiefs and villagers from 33 villages in the same research 
area (see Bulte et al 2017). For this sample we collected data on education levels (school years) 
and occupation (“are you a trader”). We also administered a simple seven questions math test, 
and implemented a “game of errors” (where respondents had to spot the 10 differences between 
two pictures). When comparing chiefs to random villagers for this sample, we again find no 
differences (results reported in Panel G).  Another sub-sample of 41 villages from the current 
study appeared in a larger representative household survey implemented in 2010. When testing 
for differences in primary income earning activities (agriculture) and literacy between chiefs and 
random villagers for this sub-sample, we also find no significant differences (Panel H).13 Finally, 
we considered another dataset on Sierra Leone to investigate differences in human capital 
between leaders and villagers. Using data from Casey et al. (2012) from 236 villages, we find no 
difference between chiefs and villagers in terms of education. The same is true when we compare 
the subsample of households that can stand for chief, and those that cannot. Taken together, we 
believe it is unlikely that differences in management capacity drive our results.   
In both “committee” and “chief” villages, the management of project implementation 
involved ordering supplies, receiving and storing supplies, organizing construction efforts, and 
taking responsibility for maintenance of the project. Villagers, including project managers, knew 
that the NGO would return several more times to deliver requested materials. Although 
performance was monitored, managers also knew that there would be no consequence to them 
personally if the project failed, i.e. there was no sanctioning mechanism. Based on previous 
interactions with the NGO, villagers would not have expected much monitoring or accountability 
from the GRNP; this is perhaps born-out by the fact that many projects had not started several 
months after materials were delivered. Baseline data were collected during the first visit to the 
                                                        
13 Observe that the random villagers included in this comparison are not necessarily the same individuals as the ones (randomly) 
selected to join the committee (though they are drawn from the same pool). 
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village.  Due to logistical constraints we could only collect baseline data for a subsample of 34 
communities (and 584 households).14 
Between September 2010 and February 2011, GRNP delivered the materials for the 
community projects to the villages.  After that, the research team visited the villages two more 
times.  We collected mid-line data during a visit in the Spring of 2011, and end-line data during a 
visit in October-November 2012.  For both surveys, we interviewed 780 people from all 56 
villages.  In addition, we sent engineers to all villages to audit the community project.  Engineers 
entered the village “blind,” without reviewing details of what type of project the community had 
selected, or to what treatment type the village was randomly assigned.  They located whatever 
evidence of a project they could find, if any, and estimated the value of inputs into the project: 
materials used, hours of labor required, and so on.  They also assessed the quality of construction 
and maintenance.   
After this assessment was done, auditors pulled out a summary sheet explaining what 
project the village should have completed and what materials were delivered to the village.  As a 
second check, they attempted to locate or account for all the materials on the list.  They explicitly 
investigated if project materials had been used for side projects or personal projects, and if so, 
they asked to see those as well.  
4.2 Outcome Variables and Identification Strategy 
We are interested in the effect of the identity of project managers on two groups of outcomes.15  
First, we examine whether elites are more prone to divert project inputs than the average villager.  
We construct a measure of diverted inputs by subtracting the engineer’s estimate of the value of 
the constructed project from the total value of the grant (for a similar approach see Olken 2007).  
                                                        
14 During our baseline survey, we only collected data in smaller villages.  
15 Having multiple outcomes is convenient for broader interpretation of the received empirical results, but it does present certain 
statistical issues.  Specifically, having multiple outcomes can lead to multiple hypothesis testing concerns.  The results reported below 
are robust to corrections for multiple hypothesis testing using the approach of List et al. (2016).   
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We also include measures of whether the auditor could find any materials in private side projects 
in other locations in the village.16 
Second, we examine the relative effectiveness across the two groups, and ask whether 
elites or ordinary villagers are better able to implement and manage the project.  This dimension 
of success captures the elites’ managerial ability (i.e. capacity) and their incentives to manage, as 
well as their ability to command complementary inputs from villagers (i.e. authority).  We have 
several indicators of success: we used engineers’ assessments to establish whether the village had 
been able to start the project at the time of the midline survey, whether the project had been 
completed during the end-line, and to obtain measures of construction quality and maintenance of 
the project. In addition, we recorded survey-based measures on the number of hours villagers 
reported working on the project and the overall satisfaction of villagers with the project (“Did you 
benefit from the project?” and “Did the project make you better off?”). As an auxiliary measure 
of success we explore whether attitudes towards forest conservation and the implementing NGO 
are affected by the management regime. 
 In addition to measuring average treatment effects, we also examine whether the 
performance of the two management regimes varies systematically across village types.  
Following Acemoglu et al. (2013), we test whether more powerful elites are more likely to grab a 
greater share of the project, allocate less effort to ensure successful completion of the project, and 
potentially sabotage project management when the committee is responsible for implementation. 
We have two proxies for the power of the chiefs. First, for the full sample of 56 villages we have 
a proxy for political competition.  While we lack detailed information on the number of 
landowning and tax-paying families for our full sample of villages, we do know the number of 
stranger households in each community.  In what follows, we treat the number of non-stranger                                                         
16 Another, more ambiguous, measure of input diversion may be the amount of cash requested by project managers, ostensibly to be 
used to pay for (skilled) labor. Project inputs came in the form of construction materials and tools delivered by GRNP Program, but 
managers could also ask for cash to pay for the use of labor. Anecdotal evidence suggests cash is particularly easy for managers to 
appropriate for themselves, but chiefs may also request different amounts of cash than villagers because they have different beliefs or 
expectations about the amount of skilled labor necessary to complete the project. As an extra test we examine whether chiefs ask for a 
larger share of the grant in the form of cash.  
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households as a proxy for the potential number of challengers, or as a proxy for the dilution or 
concentration of power.   We thus ask whether the relative performance of the project managers 
varies with the strength of local elites.  Because some non-strangers do not own land, we likely 
overestimate the number of real challengers and underestimate the power of the local elites.  
However, this “bias” is not correlated with our randomly assigned management regime, so should 
not affect the direction of the comparative statics results. Second, for a smaller sample of 34 
villages we have a more direct measure of chief power obtained from our baseline survey where 
we asked whether households were eligible to become village chief. When we use this proxy as a 
measure of chief power our results are qualitatively similar (reported in appendix Tables A6a and 
A6b). 
To estimate average treatment effects, we regress the relevant outcome variable (Yj) for 
village j on the binary treatment variable Tj (where T=1 indicates a “committee village”),: 
Yj = α + βTTj + εj      (1) 
where εj is an error term and βT is the coefficient of interest.  In models based on household data 
(Yij) we cluster standard errors at the village level.  In a set of auxiliary regressions, we include a 
vector of observable characteristics (Xj) plausibly correlated with our outcome variables: village 
size, distance to chiefdom headquarter town, total grant size and NGO performance (i.e. did the 
NGO deliver the materials on time)17:  
  Yj = α + βTTj + βXXj + εj     (2) 
The “chief as despot” thesis suggests that elites grab more than ordinary villagers (i.e., 
βT<0 in models explaining diversion of inputs), and perhaps with elites performing more poorly 
                                                        
17 Controls are added to increase precision in our estimates. We include distance to Chiefdom headquarter towns to capture remoteness 
and distance to main markets. Remote villages face higher transaction costs and hence the implicit value (and costs for exchanging) of 
the aid goods delivered to the community vary. We add village size to control for within village dynamics related to opportunities for 
free riding on the development project. We add grant size to control for slight variations in total grant size. Note none of these 
variables are correlated with treatment. We also include a control variable measuring NGO performance, measuring the timing of the 
supply of project inputs to the village, by the NGO. We found that the NGO was more likely to deliver materials on time in villages 
where chiefs managed the project (see Table 1, Panel A).  
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in terms of overall management (βT>0 in models explaining project performance).18  As 
mentioned, one alternative explanation for βT>0 in performance models is that the committee has 
less managerial capacity in implementing the community project.  However, when comparing 
chiefs and villagers (in Table 1) we do not find any disparate observable characteristics in 
measures of education, wealth and cognitive function. Taken together, there is no evidence that 
differences in management capacity drives our results.   
To empirically investigate heterogeneous treatment effects, we include an interaction 
term capturing the product of the treatment indicator and a variable capturing the power of the 
elites (Pj).  In particular we estimate: 
  Yj = α + βTTj + βPPj + βITjPj + βXXj + εj .    (3) 
This specification enables us to further scrutinize the “chief as despot” hypothesis because we can 
now explore whether more powerful elites are more corrupt and less likely to successfully 
implement the project.  This implies testing whether βP<0 in models where the dependent 
variable Yj captures inputs diverted or project completion (and where Pj captures the number of 
households from non-stranger families19), and testing whether βP>0 in models where Yj represents 
a measure of success (note that the number of native families, P, is inversely related to power of 
the elites).   
 Further, equation (3) enables us to examine whether powerful chiefs seek to undermine 
the workings of the committee, as suggested by Uvin (2008).  Assuming power facilitates 
sabotage by the elite, we expect βI>0 in models explaining committee performance. As the 
number of potential political challengers increases, this effect should weaken and committees 
would perform better.                                                          
18 In addition, another explanation is that there are differences in the opportunity costs of time between chiefs and villagers. Yet, even 
if communities in rural Sierra Leone are socially stratified, there are only small differences in material wealth. In fact, we do not 
document significant differences between members of the elite and committee – everybody is very poor and equally engaged in 
agriculture (see Table 1). Moreover, agricultural productivity is characterized by clear seasonal patterns, and while everybody is very 
busy when preparing a new farm for the next season or when harvesting the crops, there are also extended periods during which most 
villagers have ample time. Since we are assessing a two year time span from the delivery of the goods, we do not believe that lack of 
time constitutes a major constraint for most project managers.  
19 We focus on chiefly households rather than families as in some villages (and indeed: chiefdoms) there have been intense conflicts 
between family members from the same lineage.  
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Our power proxy implies two potential confounds.  First, and as discussed above, 
differences in human capital or management capacity between elites and non-elites might explain 
why performance in villages with many chiefly families (or few strangers) is different from 
performance in villages with few chiefly families. As committee members are randomly selected, 
the share of elites in the committee is increasing in the share of chiefly families in the village. The 
power of the chief could thus correlate with the level of human capital available in the committee. 
However, we find no evidence for differences in human capital between elites and non-elites, or 
between natives and strangers (Table 1). In addition, we control for differences in human capital 
(at the committee level, and interacted with treatment) in supplementary regressions and find that 
results on our core variables are qualitatively similar (see Tables A4). Second, the share of 
natives (strangers) may be correlated with social capital in the village.  Perhaps people are more 
likely to be connected in kinship networks in villages with a high share of natives. Hence, villages 
with powerful elites (i.e. a smaller share of natives) could also have lower social capital, 
providing an alternative mechanism for any differences in project performance. We collected 
social capital data in a subsample of villages (41 out of 56) in a previous survey and again include 
this in our main regression. Our results maintain (see Tables A5).20 
 
5.  Field Experimental Results 
5.1 Average Treatment Effects 
Our main results on aid capture are summarized in Table 2a.  Panel A presents our results without 
controls (corresponding to equation (1) above) and Panel B adds the vector of controls 
(corresponding to equation (2)). To economize on space we only report the coefficients of 
interest, i.e. the coefficient associated with the chief treatment (βT).  For our three main proxies                                                         
20 Unfortunately, we lack data on social capital for our full sample. We do have social capital is measured for a subsample of villages 
(41 out of 56) included in an earlier survey. There we asked a World Value Survey type questions (measuring social capital in family 
members, fellow villagers, and “strangers”) and record the average responses on a five point scale. Specifically, we asked respondents 
four questions: How much do you respect these co-villagers? How much do you trust co-villagers? If you were in trouble, would you 
go to co-villagers for help? How well do think co-villagers represent your interest? We summed the answers across all categories and 
create a village level average.     
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for input diversion, we find no evidence that more materials are missing in the chief groups: there 
is no difference in the audit value of the project minus the value of the grant between chief and 
committee villages.21 Also, there is no evidence that project inputs showed up in irregular places 
(e.g., auditors did not find zinc sheets from the project on the roof of the chief's residence or in 
the possession of other village members).  Conversely, the finding that input diversion does not 
increase in “committee” villages may reflect that mandates were unambiguously assigned, 
attenuating the types of potential common pool problems highlighted by Beath et al. (2013). 
In Table 2b we provide complementary results on project implementation. Chief villages 
are on average more likely to start with the project within a two-year period (column 1) and are 
also more likely to finish it in time (column 2). Note that even in Chief villages the project 
commencement and completion is far from complete: in 77% the project started, and it was 
successfully finished within the study period of two years in only about 53% of these villages. In 
comparison, the committee villagers did a lot worse: in committee villages 23%-30% less projects 
had been started or competed. This suggests that chiefs are better managers of this type of 
community projects. This is supported by midline data (see Appendix Table A2), when auditors 
were (22%) more likely to find evidence of a project in chief villages than in committee villages 
(p<0.05).     
Columns (3)-(4) provide further evidence that chiefs are better managers than ordinary 
villagers. Specifically, in spite of the small size of our sample (and considerable measurement 
error, undoubtedly), we find that projects in “chief” villages are better constructed and maintained 
(a 0.7 to 0.8 level difference on a five point scale), without people in the community reporting 
that they had to work more hours on the project (columns 5).  Although individuals in the villages 
did not report that they were more or less satisfied with elites as managers (column 6) we do find 
that a larger share of the villagers believe they “benefitted from the project” and are “better off”                                                         
21 Note the coefficient is large and noisily estimated. On average in chief villages the grant value exceeds the audit value by $60. In 
committee villages this discrepancy is larger by about $63-$81 corresponding to the greater absence of projects in committee villages 
(Table 2b). 
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as a result of the intervention (a 0.31-0.36 level increase on a five point scale, see columns 7 and 
8). Apparently, it is not easy for development agencies to find alternative strategies to provide 
local goods.22 
A final conclusion that may be gleaned from Table 2b is that it is difficult for NGOs to 
“buy” support for their work by implementing livelihood projects.  The Gola Rainforest National 
Park Program runs this livelihood program explicitly to engender goodwill in the communities 
bordering the national park because they need people to cooperate with the conservation rules that 
govern the park. If attitudes towards the NGO were a function of the success of the project 
implementation, then (in light of the difference in performance between chief and committee 
villages) we would expect different levels of satisfaction across treatments. Instead, we cannot 
reject that satisfaction is the same across treatments. Columns (9) and (10) suggest the 
governance modality is negatively related to the attitudes of villagers towards either the 
implementing NGO or overarching conservation program. We have probe the robustness of this 
insight by using alternative proxies for the attitudes of villagers in forest edge communities, and 
find similar results (see Appendix Table A3). 
One question that immediately arises is whether the chief and committee villages follow 
a different path to stewarding their projects.  We find, on average, elite managers asked for more 
cash than committees of villagers.  In our sample, managers in 23% of chief villages requested 
cash versus 8% of the committee villages, but this is only statistically significant at the p < 0.11 
level.  In addition, elite managers requested on average USD 18 for skilled labor, but committees 
requested only USD 3 (p=0.06).  In percentage terms, elites ask on average 4,5% of project funds 
in the form of cash, while committees take less than 2% (p=0.09).  This difference in cash 
                                                        
22 In additional analysis we have regressed our measures of input diversion and project implementation on characteristics of the chief 
(his age, gender, and farm size). This did not produce meaningful correlations, so we conclude that development agencies cannot 
easily improve performance by simply picking chiefs with certain on observable characteristics. 
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requests amounts to nearly USD 15, which is a sizable amount of cash in this part of rural Sierra 
Leone, but modest in light of the value of the total grant, close to 5%.23   
5.2  Does the Chief’s Power Matter?   
We do not “experimentally vary” chief power across villages, so our ability to test hypotheses 
involving the (conditioning) effect of power on performance is limited.  Moreover, as mentioned, 
we measure power with considerable noise. With these important qualifications in mind, we now 
probe the impact of chief power in Tables 3a and 3b.   
We obtain mixed evidence for the hypothesis that chief power is correlated with input 
diversion.  According to column (1) in Table 3a, on average committees divert more money than 
elites.  While the extent of political competition does not affect diversion by the elite, it is 
correlated with “missing inputs” in committee villages.  In committee villages with more 
powerful chiefs (i.e., those with less non-stranger or chiefly families that can provide 
countervailing power to the village chief), fewer inputs are missing (a one standard deviation 
increase in non-stranger families in committee villages decreases the gap between grant value and 
audit value by about $150). As the number of non-stranger families in the village increases, it is 
also true that the probability that a member of the committee is connected to one of the chiefly 
families increases, which would explain this pattern. This implies that committees of average 
villagers get stronger (i.e. more prone to the diversion of resources from the project) as the 
concentration of power in the village gets more diffuse, whereas chiefs may get weaker (i.e. less 
prone to the diversion of resources). We also find that, in chief villages, the presence of side 
projects or materials found in other locations is not associated with the power of the chief 
(column 2, Panel B and C).  
                                                        
23 In the end-line survey, we asked villagers about their opinion regarding the diversion of project resources by the chief. When asked 
what percentage of project resources chiefs are allowed to take for himself, on average subjects said 9.3 percent. Seventy-one percent 
of villagers also indicated that the chief should take some project resources for himself. If villagers perceive diversion as 
compensation for a valuable service, then perhaps it represents a fee, rather than theft. As mentioned above, differences in cash 
requests may also reflect diverging expectations with respect to labor requirements. For these reasons, we prefer to use the more direct 
measurements of input diversion – the results on cash requests are reported in Appendix Table A1. 
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Our results in Table 3b support the interpretation that committee performance is 
conditional on the power of the chief.24  Specifically, committees perform worse on several key 
measures of success (started, construction and maintenance, satisfaction) if the chief is more 
powerful in the village. For example, for each 30 additional non-stranger households (about 1 
standard deviation) the probability that a project is completed in committee villages increases by 
24%.  
As mentioned, the share of non-strangers may be correlated with social and human 
capital variables, potentially biasing our results.  In Appendix Tables A4 and A5, we control for 
differences in social capital (at the village level) and human capital (at the committee level), and 
find that results on our core variables are qualitatively similar. Also, in Appendix Table A6 we 
report similar results using an alternative power proxy for a smaller subsample of villages.25  
The results presented are consistent with several hypotheses, including a “chief as 
saboteur” hypothesis. In this case, chiefs may actively seek to signal to our NGO that they should 
work through village elites the next time they dispense aid.  The committee structure threatens the 
chief’s future power or role as broker and liaison with the outside world, and more powerful 
chiefs are better able to undermine the committee's efforts.  While we did not search for (direct) 
evidence on sabotage activities undertaken by the chief, it is possible that chiefs attempt to 
undermine the performance (and, hence, legitimacy) of the committee introduced in “their” 
village.  This may be achieved, for example, by obstructing committee efforts to mobilize labor to 
implement the project (column 5).  However, we hasten to add that our interpretation of these 
data is necessarily speculative, and should be tested more rigorously in future empirical work.                                                           
24 Note too that the effect of power on project performance is much weaker (possibly ambiguous) in case the chief is the project 
manager. 
25 In addition, we investigated another potential channel via which village chiefs may be less accountable. Disgruntled villagers 
seeking to remove their chief should file a complaint to the paramount or section chief. We conjecture that a paramount or district 
chief would be less inclined to remove a family member from power. Anticipating this response, unhappy villagers are presumably 
less likely to file a complaint in the first place. So if village chiefs have family members in “high places” we assume they are more 
powerful. To probe this conjecture, we compared the family names of our village chiefs to the names of the higher chiefs, and 
contacted all paramount chiefs to ask about family relationships. Unfortunately, only two of “our” village chiefs were family-related to 
a paramount chief, and only one of these two villages was assigned to the committee treatment (where we would expect “powerful 
chiefs” to sabotage the project). It is interesting to observe that the committee project in the village with the powerful chief (thus 
defined) was indeed an utter failure, and did not even start after two years.  
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6.  Conclusions and discussion 
A growing literature in economics and political science points to weak governance as a major 
cause of (African) under-development, and argues that poor management is not restricted to 
"predatory" or incapable states.  At the local level, leaders are often perceived to be either 
incapable or corrupt.  One hypothesis explaining such patterns is that colonial systems of indirect 
rule severed ties of accountability between chiefs and villagers.  The so-called "chief as despot" 
thesis has gained momentum, and has spurred a search for alternative governance modalities at 
the local level.  The surge in funding for participatory development interventions that bypass both 
central and decentralized levels of government is a prominent manifestation of this ambition. 
 Rigorous statistical evidence on the management performance of local leadership in 
Africa is scarce, however.  In what has been done, a mixed picture emerges.  For example, while 
Acemoglu et al. (2013) find some support for the “chief as despot” thesis by considering public 
good provision at the level of paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone, a recent study by Humphreys et 
al. (2015) does not support the view of widespread diversion of aid money at the local level in the 
DRC.     
 While more powerful chiefs will be more corrupt by diverting more resources from the 
public good to their personal benefit, under-invest in management of the project, and seek to 
undermine the performance of managing committees, our empirical findings provide a more 
nuanced and mixed picture of the quality of local management in Africa.  Our field experiment 
finds little evidence that local elites managing an aid project divert more resources than the 
average villager, or that more powerful chiefs divert more than less powerful ones.  Moreover, the 
village elites are able to manage a development project better than a committee of randomly 
selected villagers (which is not surprising and should not be misconstrued as an argument in favor 
of customary leadership over democratically-elected councils, as our committees were not 
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elected).26  Projects managed by village elites are also more likely to start and be completed on 
time, are better constructed and maintained, and provide more (perceived) benefits for the 
villagers.27 We note, that even in villages where elites managed the project, performance was 
relatively poor.  In about 34% of villages, projects were never implemented.  
Three candidate explanations for differences in performance immediately leap to mind.  
Chiefs may (1) have superior abilities to implement and oversee a project (due to learning by 
doing, or because chiefs are selected based on characteristics correlated with management 
ability); (2) chiefs may be able to draw on complementary village resources by virtue of their 
formal authority; or (3) chiefs may have stronger (dynamic) incentives to successfully complete 
the project because they expect future benefits from successful project completion.  We lack the 
data to uncover which mechanism explains why the chief tends to outperform the committee.  
However, we do observe that in our research area chiefs have similar characteristics as the 
villagers they govern, and that they are not significantly different in terms of for example income, 
gender, or levels of education. Chiefs also perform no better at simple cognitive tests. We also 
show that chiefs can more effectively engage with the NGO (arguably a measure of ability or 
quality). According to our data, on average 23% of the chief villages received their first batch of 
materials late, compared to 58% of the committee villages (see Table 1).  Future research should 
further probe the mechanism explaining differences in performance between chiefs and 
committees.   
A fourth reason to explain the difference in performance between chiefs and committees: 
sabotage by the chief in case the committee is responsible for project management.  Vested 
interests associated with pre-existing institutions (traditional agrarian hierarchies) may view the 
newly introduced management regime as a threat to their authority and position, and seek to                                                         
26 As aforementioned, electing council members may enable villagers to select the “best candidates” from their midst, but also opens 
the door to elite capture if the elite is able to obtain sufficient support for its proxies. 
27 While villages selected projects before they knew who would manage the project, most villagers presumably believed the chief 
would implement the project. It is possible that villager committees have an advantage in managing different types of projects, in 
which case the discriminating alignment theory predicts that fully informed villages would have selected a different project had they 
known the identity of the project manager. If so, we underestimate the potential of committees to successfully manage certain projects.  
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undermine the legitimacy of such institutional innovations by sabotage.  We hypothesize that 
more powerful chiefs are better able to do this, and may obstruct the functioning of the 
committee.  We obtain some non-experimental data that are consonant with this hypothesis.  We 
document that, across a range of relevant performance measures, committees score worse when 
the chief is more powerful when we use a measure of local political competition as a proxy for 
chief power.   
Overall, our research implies a warning to policy makers and development practitioners 
seeking approaches to circumvent local elites or tie their hands to curtail rent capture.  Consistent 
with recent evidence by Casey et al. (2012) and Humphreys et al. (2015), we find that creating 
viable parallel institutions for project implementation is challenging and that it is far from easy to 
provide viable alternative mechanisms to provide local public goods.28  It is an open question 
whether equity gains of such approaches are dominated by efficiency losses, and it may be 
worthwhile to instead explore strategies that involve providing incentives to elites to facilitate 
project implementation.  This may create a dilemma between short-term efficiency in project 
implementation versus long-term implications of imbalanced power relationships.  Working via 
elites may cement their position of power within existing patron-client networks.  A challenge for 
researchers interested in the management of development resources is to probe how communities 
can move from dependence on effective local elites to systems where projects are completed with 
high participation and performance. 
 
  
                                                        
28 In comparison, our study is similar in that it creates local committee that manage (block) grants with an emphasis on participation 
and management and but smaller in scale with fewer villages and a slightly lower amount per household (on average).   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Characteristic Chief  (SD) 
Committee  
(SD) 
Difference  
(p-value) 
Obs 
households 
Obs 
villages 
Panel A: Community Project       
Construction project (b) 0.80 0.92 -0.12  56 
 (0.41) (0.27) (0.20)   
Construction of a mosque (b) 0.30 0.49 -0.19  56 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.15)   
Construction of a town barri (b) 0.30 0.11 0.18  56 
 (0.46) (0.32) (0.10)   
Construction of a guesthouse (b) 0.16 0.19 -0.03  56 
 (0.37) (0.40) (0.79)   
Grant value (in USD) (b) 424.33 450.84 -26.52  56 
 (134.66) (134.61) (0.47)   
NGO performance (1=materials late) (b) 0.23 0.58 -0.34  56 
 (0.43) (0.50) (0.01)   
Panel B: Respondent level      
Male (1=yes) (a) 0.81 0.83 -0.02 581 34 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.68)   
Age (years) (a) 0.87 0.88 -0.02 584 34 
 (0.34) (0.32) (0.78)   
Muslim (1 = yes) (a) 0.69 0.72 -0.04 880 56 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.39)   
Family could have chief (1=yes) (a) 43.52 42.83 0.68 881 56 
 (15.76) (15.00) (0.61)   
Male (1=yes) (b) 43.94 42.69 1.25 584 34 
 (15.81) (15.15) (0.40)   
Age (years) (b) 0.97 0.94 0.03 584 34 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.12)   
Mende (1 = yes) (a) 0.54 0.58 -0.05 567 34 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)   
Stranger (1= yes) (b) 0.17 0.23 -0.07 882 56 
 (0.37) (0.42) (0.12)   
Farm size (acres) (b) 28.69 27.26 1.43 827 56 
 (26.81) (15.84) (0.54)   
Panel C: Community level      
Number of “Chief Households” (a) 9.59 9.00 0.59  34 
 (4.14) (5.02) (0.71)   
Number of “Non-Stranger Households” (b) 30.65 32.54 -1.89  56 
 (31.13) (30.75) (0.82)   
Village size (#households) (b) 36.35 40.10 -3.75  56 
 (32.99) (33.07) (0.67)   
Distance to chiefdom headquarter town (b)  12.77 15.75 -2.98  56 
 (7.98) (5.82) (0.12)   
Social capital [0-16](d) 14.31 14.08 0.23  41 
 (1.55) (1.61) (0.65)   
      
Panel D: Chief Council vs Villager Council  Chiefs council Villagers council    
Male (1=yes) (b) 0.72 0.75 -0.03 158 56 
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.56)   
Age (years) (b) 47.76 41.50 6.26 159 56 
 (16.09) (14.05) (0.01)   
Farm size (acres) (b) 32.44 27.72 4.71 150 56 
 (51.96) (14.93) (0.47)   
Stranger (1=yes) (b) 0.10 0.20 -0.10 159 56 
 (0.30) (0.40) (0.09)   
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Table 1 (continued). Descriptive Statistics  
Characteristic Chief  (SD) 
Committee  
(SD) 
Difference  
(p-value) 
Obs 
households 
Obs 
villages 
Panel E: Chiefs vs Villager Council  Chiefs in council  Villagers council     
Male (1=yes) (b) 0.97 0.75 0.22 105 55 
 (0.19) (0.44) (0.00)   
Age (years) (b) 58.24 41.50 16.74 105 55 
 (17.58) (14.05) (0.00)   
Farm size (acres) (b) 44.81 27.72 17.09 99 53 
 (86.16) (14.93) (0.30)   
Stranger (1=yes) (b) 0.00 0.20 -0.20 105 55 
  (0.00) (0.40) (0.00)   
      
Panel F: Strangers vs Non Strangers in 
committee Non stranger Stranger    
Male (b) 0.74 0.80 -0.06 76 26 
 (0.44) (0.41) (0.61)   
Age (b) 42.48 37.53 4.94 76 26 
 (15.11) (7.70) (0.12)   
Farm size (b) 28.09 26.18 1.92 72 26 
 (14.90) (15.52) (0.66)   
      
Panel G: Chiefs vs Villagers Chiefs  Villagers    
Math score (# correct, 0 to 7) (c) 3.62 3.57 0.05 424 25 
 (1.84) (1.58) (0.86)   
Errors game (# correct, 0 to 10) (c) 1.10 1.22 -0.12 407 25 
 (0.71) (0.65) (0.21)   
School years (years) (c) 1.47 1.72 -0.25 379 25 
 (3.42) (3.52) (0.64)   
Trader (1=yes) (c) 0.42 0.48 -0.05 553 33 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.34)   
      
Panel H: Chiefs vs Villagers Chiefs Villagers    
Primary income is from agriculture (1 = yes) (d) 0.91 0.92 -0.01 216 39 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.86)   
Literacy in Arabic (1 = yes) (d) 0.29 0.20 0.08 216 39 
 (0.46) (0.40) (0.33)   
Any formal schooling (1=yes) (e) 0.32 0.26 0.06 1986 194 
 (0.47) (0.44) (0.32)   
Any formal schooling (1=yes) (e) 0.27 0.26 0.01 1971 194 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.67)   
Standard errors clustered at village level for household level comparisons. Data sources: (a) Baseline survey data, 34 villages, (b) 
Endline data, 56 villages, (c) Data from Bulte et al (2017), 33 villages, (d) Household Survey 2010, 41 villages, overlapping with FEC 
sample (e) Casey et al replication files available through Harvard Dataverse of households that can stand for Chief vs households that 
cannot stand for Chief. 
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Table 2a. Project Outcomes, Aid diversion 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Audit value of project 
minus grant value 
Presence of side projects Presence of project 
materials at other locations 
Panel A: no controls    
Committee -62.592 -0.065 0.043 
 (104.178) (0.073) (0.118) 
    
Obs. 56 52 53 
    
Panel B: with controls    
Committee -81.193 -0.066 0.002 
 (107.374) (0.079) (0.113) 
    
Obs. 56 52 53 
    
Mean Chief group -59.917 0.107 0.207 
Scale (-571.43, 1193.33) [0,1] [0,1] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions in Panel B include controls: village size, 
distance to Chiefdom headquarters town and project grant value (USD) (except for column (1)) and NGO 
performance. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2b. Project Outcomes, Implementation 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level for column (5)-(10). Regressions in Panel B include 
controls: village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarters town and project grant value (USD) and NGO performance. * p < 0.10, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)    
 Project started 
end-line 
Project mostly 
complete end-
line 
How well 
constructed is 
the project? 
How well 
maintained is 
the project? 
Hours reported 
worked on the 
project (ln) 
Satisfied with 
project 
management? 
Did you 
benefit from 
the project? 
Are   
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
Panel A: no controls           
Committee -0.228* -0.226* -0.836* -0.715 0.098 -0.107 -0.363** -    
 (0.127) (0.131) (0.446) (0.472) (0.170) (0.091) (0.159)    
           
Obs. 56 56 56 56 801 830 867    
           
Panel B: with controls           
Committee -0.301** -0.276* -0.940* -1.062** -0.074 -0.099 -0.452*** -    
 (0.135) (0.141) (0.489) (0.500) (0.157) (0.130) (0.167)    
           
Obs. 56 56 56 56 801 830 867    
           
Mean Chief group 0.767 0.533 2.567 2.600 1.650 4.042 3.748    
Scale [0,1]  [0,1] [0-5] [0-5] [0, 6.10) [1-5] [1-5]    
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Table 3a. Heterogeneity Chief Power, Aid diversion 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Audit value of project 
minus grant value 
Presence of side projects Presence of project 
materials at other locations 
Panel A: no controls    
Committee -223.128* -0.100 0.072 
 (124.678) (0.096) (0.168) 
    
Non-Stranger Households -0.649 -0.001 -0.000 
 (1.541) (0.001) (0.002) 
    
Non-Stranger Households * 
Committee 
4.971 0.001 -0.001 
 (2.987) (0.001) (0.003) 
    
Observations 56 52 53 
    
Panel B: with controls    
Committee -266.222** -0.100 -0.005 
 (117.773) (0.108) (0.151) 
    
Non-Stranger Households 6.898 0.007* -0.006 
 (6.597) (0.004) (0.010) 
    
Non-Stranger Households * 
Committee 
5.604* 0.001 -0.000 
 (3.057) (0.001) (0.003) 
    
Observations 56 52 53 
    
Mean Chief group -59.917 0.107 0.207 
Scale (-571.43, 1193.33) [0,1] [0,1] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions in Panel B includes village size, distance to Chiefdom 
headquarters town, project value (USD) (except for column (1)) and NGO performance. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3b. Heterogeneity Chief Power, Implementation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Project 
started end-
line 
Project mostly 
complete end-
line 
How well 
constructed is 
the project? 
How well 
maintained is 
the project? 
Hours reported 
worked on the 
project (ln) 
Satisfied with 
project 
management? 
Did you 
benefit from 
the project? 
Are you 
better off? 
Are you 
satisfied with 
the GRNP? 
Do you 
support 
conserving 
GRNP? 
           
Panel A: no controls 
Committee -0.495*** -0.224 -1.759*** -1.694** -0.245 -0.300** -0.364 -0.346* -0.163 -0.175 
 (0.174) (0.183) (0.601) (0.654) (0.163) (0.130) (0.230) (0.198) (0.267) (0.177) 
           
Non-Stranger 
Households 
-0.002 0.002 -0.006 -0.008 0.006*** -0.001 0.001 0.004* 0.004* 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
           
Non-Stranger 
Households * 
Committee 
0.008* -0.000 0.029** 0.031** 0.009 0.005** -0.000 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
           
Obs. 56 56 56 56 801 830 867 875 882 882 
 
Panel: with controls 
Committee -0.668*** -0.303 -2.105*** -2.446*** -0.492*** -0.338* -0.495* -0.416* 0.210 0.005 
 (0.148) (0.195) (0.548) (0.520) (0.166) (0.199) (0.250) (0.223) (0.223) (0.167) 
           
Non-Stranger 
Households 
0.010 -0.000 0.023 0.025 0.012 0.001 0.021** 0.010 0.013 0.016** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.031) (0.033) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
           
Non-Stranger 
Households * 
Committee 
0.011*** 0.001 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.011** 0.006** 0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
           
Obs. 56 56 56 56 801 830 867 875 882 882 
           
Mean Chief group 0.767 0.533 2.567 2.600 1.650 4.042 3.748 3.204 3.620 4.090 
Scale [0,1]  [0,1] [0-5] [0-5] [0, 6.10) [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level for Column (5)-(10). Regressions in Panel B include village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarters town and project 
value (USD) and NGO performance. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Project Outcomes, Cash Requested 
 (1) 
 Percent of grant requested as 
cash 
Panel A: no controls  
Committee -2.744* 
 (1.537) 
  
Obs. 56 
  
Panel B: with controls  
Committee -4.438** 
 (1.698) 
  
Obs. 56 
  
Mean Chief group 4.506 
Scale [0, 21.60) 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Regressions in Panel B include controls: village size, 
distance to Chiefdom headquarter town and project grant 
value (USD) and NGO performance. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table A2. Project Outcomes, Implementation Midline 
 (1) 
 Project started midline 
Panel A: no controls  
Committee -0.225** 
 (0.105) 
  
Observations 54 
  
Panel B: with controls  
Committee -0.353*** 
 (0.123) 
  
Observations 54 
  
Mean Chief group 0.933 
Scale [0,1] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression 
in Panel B includes village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarter 
town and project value (USD) and NGO performance. * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3. Project Outcomes, Implementation, Alternative Satisfaction Proxies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Have you 
benefitted from 
GFP? 
Are people who do 
illegal activities 
reported? 
Have you changed 
the way you farm? 
Is the forest 
healthier and 
stronger? 
Are you satisfied 
with organization by 
GFP? 
Are you satisfied 
with materials? 
Do you use and 
benefit project? 
Are you better off? 
Panel A: no controls 
Committee -0.239 -0.013 -0.040 -0.076 -0.294*** -0.333** -0.363** -0.305** 
 (0.175) (0.124) (0.047) (0.069) (0.099) (0.129) (0.159) (0.135) 
         
Observations 880 780 876 837 878 863 867 875 
         
Panel B: with controls 
Committee -0.282* 0.093 -0.016 0.001 -0.311*** -0.330** -0.452*** -0.361** 
 (0.151) (0.118) (0.050) (0.063) (0.093) (0.126) (0.167) (0.149) 
         
Observations 880 780 876 837 878 863 867 875 
         
Mean Chief group 3.518 3.859 4.112 4.385 3.901 3.820 3.748 3.200 
Scale [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level. Regression includes village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarter town and project value (USD) and NGO 
performance. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A4a. Heterogeneity Chief Power, Aid diversion, Human Capital controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Audit value of project 
minus grant value 
Presence of side projects Presence of project 
materials at other locations 
Committee -308.756 -1.311 0.532 
 (824.028) (0.800) (1.108) 
    
Non-Stranger Households 9.438 0.004 -0.010 
 (7.605) (0.004) (0.012) 
    
Non-Stranger Households * 
Committee 
4.982 0.005 0.001 
 (5.216) (0.003) (0.006) 
    
Gender (% male) -165.564 -0.049 0.287 
 (337.082) (0.230) (0.378) 
    
Committee * gender (% male) 448.361 -0.147 -0.990 
 (468.584) (0.268) (0.603) 
    
Average age 13.148 -0.016 -0.002 
 (11.219) (0.012) (0.014) 
    
Committee * (av) age  -10.973 0.023* 0.003 
 (16.623) (0.013) (0.019) 
    
Average farm size -0.049 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.822) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Committee * (av) farm size 9.203 0.002 -0.000 
 (6.211) (0.002) (0.011) 
    
Stranger (%) -155.756 -0.925 -0.424 
 (521.926) (0.577) (0.569) 
    
Committee * Stranger (%) 60.234 0.978 0.227 
 (645.304) (0.614) (0.751) 
Observations 56 52 53 
    
Mean Chief group -59.917 0.107 0.207 
Scale (-571.43, 1193.33) [0,1] [0,1] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression includes village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarter town, 
project value (USD) (except for column (1)) and NGO performance and chief/villager committee gender, age, income and stranger 
and interactions). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A4b. Heterogeneity Chief Power, Implementation, Human Capital controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Project 
started end-
line 
Project mostly 
complete end-
line 
How well 
constructed is 
the project? 
How well 
maintained is 
the project? 
Hours reported 
worked on the 
project (ln) 
Satisfied with 
project 
management? 
Did you 
benefit from 
the project? 
Are you 
better off? 
Are you 
satisfied with 
the GRNP? 
Do you 
support 
conserving 
GRNP? 
Committee -1.809* -2.060* -4.702 -7.907** 0.019 1.016 -0.551 -0.734 0.684 -0.389 
 (0.967) (1.194) (3.621) (3.558) (0.833) (0.892) (1.219) (1.076) (1.175) (0.879) 
           
Non-Stranger Households 0.012 0.004 0.036 0.038 0.018* 0.005 0.026*** 0.014 0.009 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.037) (0.038) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
           
Non-Stranger Households 
* Committee 
0.011** 0.004 0.034* 0.046** 0.008* 0.007* 0.002 0.005 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.020) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
           
Gender (% male) -0.510 -0.310 -1.294 -1.124 -0.034 -0.043 -0.139 -0.215 0.233 -0.252 
 (0.378) (0.466) (1.472) (1.417) (0.317) (0.353) (0.512) (0.495) (0.369) (0.344) 
           
Committee * gender (%  0.899 0.726 2.946 3.005 1.122** -0.539 0.083 -0.513 -0.952 -0.001 
male) (0.539) (0.689) (1.969) (2.003) (0.510) (0.543) (0.746) (0.678) (0.674) (0.500) 
           
Average age -0.002 -0.003 0.018 -0.018 0.014 0.013 -0.002 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.053) (0.047) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
           
Committee * (av) age  0.003 0.018 -0.009 0.041 -0.024 -0.023 -0.007 0.008 0.005 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.071) (0.070) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) 
           
Average farm size -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
           
Committee * (av) farm  0.011 0.008 0.030 0.038 -0.004 0.001 0.010 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
size (0.009) (0.008) (0.032) (0.033) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) 
           
Stranger (%) -0.294 0.133 -0.072 -0.904 0.087 0.033 0.020 0.247 -0.015 -0.602 
 (0.504) (0.875) (2.448) (2.291) (0.370) (0.370) (0.538) (0.575) (0.696) (0.513) 
           
Committee * Stranger (%) 0.179 0.279 0.295 1.661 -0.093 0.258 0.187 0.411 -0.044 0.482 
 (0.685) (0.995) (3.058) (3.096) (0.487) (0.490) (0.871) (0.729) (0.945) (0.730) 
           
Observations 56 56 56 56 801 830 867 875 882 882 
           
Mean Chief group 0.767 0.533 2.567 2.600 1.650 4.042 3.748 3.204 3.620 4.090 
Scale [0,1]  [0,1] [0-5] [0-5] [0, 6.10) [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level for Column (5)-(10). Regression includes village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarter town, project value (USD) and NGO performance, and chief/villager committee gender, age, 
income and stranger and interactions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A5a. Heterogeneity Chief Power, Aid diversion. Social Capital  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Audit value of project 
minus grant value 
Presence of side projects Presence of project 
materials at other locations 
Committee -1429.601 0.329 1.198 
 (-1135.133) -1.072 -1.058 
    
Non-Stranger Households -2.499 0.013 0.004 
 (-11.697) (0.011) (0.019) 
    
Non-Stranger Households * 
Committee 
7.704 -0.001 0.003 
 (-5.053) (0.002) (0.008) 
    
Social Capital (2010 Survey) -21.279 0.078 0.079 
 (-65.783) (0.065) (0.060) 
    
Committee * Social Capital 81.545 -0.021 -0.086 
 (-77.846) (0.079) (0.080) 
    
Observations 41 37 38 
    
Mean Chief group -70.589 0.063 0.235 
Scale (-571.43, 1193.33) [0,1] [0,1] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression includes village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarter town, 
project value (USD) (except for column (1)) and NGO performance and social capital and social capital * committee. * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A5b. Heterogeneity Chief Power, Implementation. Social Capital  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Project 
started end-
line 
Project mostly 
complete end-
line 
How well 
constructed is 
the project? 
How well 
maintained is 
the project? 
Hours reported 
worked on the 
project (ln) 
Satisfied with 
project  
management? 
Did you 
benefit from 
the project? 
Are you 
better off? 
Are you 
satisfied with 
the GRNP? 
Do you 
support 
conserving 
GRNP? 
Committee -2.000* -0.824 -8.011 -6.533 -1.847* 0.148 -1.734 -4.305*** -2.156* -0.376 
 (-1.164) (-1.909) (-5.204) (-5.414) (0.968) (0.635) (-1.214) (-1.486) (-1.214) (-1.316) 
           
Number of Non-
Stranger  -0.006 -0.021 -0.046 -0.039 -0.003 0.003 0.014 -0.003 0.014 0.018 
Households (0.017) (0.020) (0.060) (0.062) (0.015) (0.009) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
           
Non-Stranger 
Households * 
Committee 0.016** 0.005 0.051** 0.057** 0.012 0.005 0.001 0.008 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.024) (0.022) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) 
           
Social Capital 
(2010 Survey) -0.002 0.021 0.020 0.090 -0.033 0.066* -0.015 -0.098 -0.053 -0.005 
 (0.058) (0.104) (0.296) (0.317) (0.033) (0.039) (0.062) (0.082) (0.075) (0.065) 
           
Committee * 
Social Capital 0.087 0.035 0.400 0.277 0.086 -0.035 0.090 0.271** 0.176* 0.032 
 (0.080) (0.131) (0.355) (0.373) (0.064) (0.056) (0.092) (0.100) (0.087) (0.089) 
           
Observations 41 41 41 41 595 621 651 651 658 658 
           
Mean Chief group 0.722 0.500 2.444 2.389 1.600 4.060 3.758 3.113 3.457 4.018 
Scale [0,1]  [0,1] [1-5] [1-5] [0, 6.10) [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level for Column (5)-(10). Regression includes village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarter town, project value (USD) and 
NGO performance, and social capital and social capital*committee.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A6a. Heterogeneity Chief Power, Aid diversion. Alternative Chief Power Proxy (subsample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Audit value of project 
minus grant value 
Presence of side projects Presence of project materials at 
other locations 
    
Committee -580.723* -0.258 0.234 
 (287.949) (0.262) (0.374) 
    
Number of chief households in 
village 
-31.526 0.019 -0.033 
 (26.393) (0.021) (0.030) 
    
Chief households * Committee 23.105 0.010 -0.013 
 (35.003) (0.031) (0.031) 
     
Obs. 34 31 34 
    
Mean Chief group 97.031 0.200 0.059 
Scale (-571.42 -1193.33) [0,1] [0,1] 
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression includes village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarter town and 
project value (USD) (except for column (1)) and NGO performance. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A6b. Heterogeneity Chief Power, Implementation. Alternative Chief Power Proxy (subsample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Project 
started end-
line 
Project mostly 
complete end-
line 
How well 
constructed is 
the project? 
How well 
maintained is 
the project? 
Hours reported 
worked on the 
project (ln) 
Satisfied with 
project 
management? 
Did you 
benefit from 
the project? 
Are you 
better off? 
Are you 
satisfied with 
the GRNP? 
Do you 
support 
conserving 
GRNP? 
           
Committee -1.155*** -1.392*** -4.606*** -4.612*** -0.110 -0.319 -0.464 -0.421 1.012*** 0.498** 
 (0.198) (0.301) (0.967) (0.812) (0.244) (0.367) (0.367) (0.400) (0.345) (0.213) 
           
Number of chief  0.001 -0.052* -0.090 0.015 0.066*** -0.010 0.085** 0.002 -0.002 -0.014 
families in village (0.022) (0.029) (0.088) (0.089) (0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.047) (0.028) (0.019) 
           
Chief families *  0.052** 0.095** 0.238* 0.195* -0.019 -0.001 -0.029 -0.002 -0.096*** -0.046* 
Committee (0.025) (0.036) (0.124) (0.101) (0.022) (0.019) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) (0.023) 
           
Obs. 34 34 34 34 471 479 516 520 522 523 
           
Mean Chief group 0.882 0.647 3.118 3.235 1.505 4.039 3.759 3.198 3.369 3.925 
Scale [0,1]  [0,1] [0-5] [0-5] [0, 6.10) [0-5]  [0-5]  [0-5]  [0-5]  [0-5]  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at village level for Column (5)-(10). Regression includes village size, distance to Chiefdom headquarter town and project value (USD) and NGO 
performance.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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On-line Appendix: A simple model to motivate the empirics 
To guide interpretation of our empirical results we now present a simple two-period model that 
highlights the key tradeoffs for the chief (as a manager, or otherwise). First, consider the case 
where the chief (or the elite, assuming away intra-elite coordination issues) is charged with the 
responsibility of managing a development project of size R. The chief has two choice variables: 
the share α of the project resources that will be diverted or grabbed for private gain, and the 
chief’s managerial effort, e, to turn the project into a success. We assume the chief does not 
intrinsically care about the project, which is expected to yield a flow of benefits for the 
community at large (but the model is readily augmented to allow the valuation of project output 
by the chief). However, in case the project is a “success” we assume next period’s power of the 
chief goes up, reflecting respect for his ability to accomplish important tasks for the village. The 
chief’s problem reads as follows: 
 Max 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒) + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒,𝛼𝛼; 𝜏𝜏) + 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒;𝐸𝐸)𝜋𝜋∗(𝜏𝜏′ (𝑒𝑒)) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑒𝑒))𝜋𝜋�,  (1) 
where f(e) denotes the gain from effort allocated to the chief’s private business (farm work, else), 
which is negatively affected by more time spent on management of the community project 
(hence: 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
< 0, 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
< 0),  c(e;α,τ) is a measure of potential opposition from disgruntled villagers 
in case not enough managerial effort is supplied (jeopardizing the success of the project), or when 
too much of the project resources are taken by the chief. We assume 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
< 0 and 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
> 0, and also  
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
> 0. The parameter τ is a measure of the chief’s power, so we assume 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
< 0, 
𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
< 0, or that more powerful managers have less opposition to fear – at the 
margin – than weak chiefs from undersupplying effort or input grabbing. The parameter E is a 
measure of experience, of managerial ability with which project inputs can be converted into 
successful project output. We denote the probability that the chief is invited by an NGO to 
manage next period’s development project with p(e;E), where 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
< 0. We thus 
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assume that more successful projects (implemented by hard-working and efficient managers) are 
likely to be followed by new projects. Finally, π* denotes the (discounted) private payoffs in 
period 2 in case the chief assumes responsibility to manage the community project, and 𝜋𝜋� denotes 
payoffs for the chief when the management responsibility, instead, is delegated to a committee of 
villagers. We assume the payoffs from being assigned as the manager are an (increasing) function 
of next period’s power, τ’, which in turn depends on current effort to turn the project into a 
success, i.e.  𝜕𝜕π∗
𝜕𝜕τ’ > 0 and 𝜕𝜕τ’𝜕𝜕e > 0. The reason why next period’s payoffs are increasing in next 
period’s power is that enhanced power may facilitate the grabbing of project resources. Finally, 
we assume the scope for diverting project resources by the chief is higher when he is the 
manager: that is: 𝜋𝜋∗ > 𝜋𝜋�. 
 The first order conditions for an optimal solution to the chief’s problem are: 
 𝛼𝛼 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0, and        (2) 
 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
−
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
+ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
(𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜋𝜋�) + 𝑝𝑝 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕′
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕′
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0,      (3) 
where the final term on the LHS of (3) captures that extra effort in the first period to turn the 
project into a success is an investment for the chief that facilitates grabbing in the future. Taking a 
total differential of (2), we obtain 
 𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
= �−𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
� �
𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
� > 0� ,        (4) 
or, intuitively, that more powerful chiefs steal a greater fraction of the project inputs (the same 
logic explains why we assume that  𝜕𝜕π∗
𝜕𝜕τ’ > 0 ). The intuition for (4) is simply that powerful chiefs 
are to a greater extent insulated or protected from unhappy responses from their dissatisfied 
constituency. Similarly, taking the total differential of (3) and rewriting yields: 
 𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
= 𝜕𝜕2𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕2𝑓𝑓
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
−
𝜕𝜕2𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
+
𝜕𝜕2𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
(𝜋𝜋∗−𝜋𝜋�)+2𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕′
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕′
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
+𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕2𝜋𝜋∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕′
2�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕′
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
�
2
+𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕′
𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕′
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
.    (5) 
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The expression in (5) cannot, in general, be signed. That is, powerful chiefs may supply more or 
less effort to manage the project.  
 Next, consider the case where a council of villagers is charged with the responsibility of 
managing the community project. Performance by the committee is a function of committee effort 
q and management experience Q (where we may assume Q<E), and sabotage effort by the chief, 
s* (see below). If committee members are randomly chosen by the NGO (and will be again in the 
future, so that current performance does not affect the likelihood of being elected as manager in 
the next period), then the committee should solve a simple static optimization problem: 
 Max W = 𝑓𝑓(𝑞𝑞) + 𝐵𝐵(𝑞𝑞;𝑄𝑄, 𝑠𝑠).       (6) 
where f(q) represents the opportunity cost of management effort (foregone returns to working on 
the own farm), and B(q;Q,s) capture project benefits for the villagers. From (6) follows 
q*=q(Q,s). 
Turn to the chief’s problem. Assume committee management restricts the chief’s short-
term scope for diverting project inputs – we consider for simplicity the extreme case where α=0. 
Again, we denote by p(ˑ) the probability that the chief is promoted to manager in the second 
period. If so, the chief can again grab project inputs (α>0), so we again assume 𝜋𝜋∗ > 𝜋𝜋�. We also 
assume the chief’s probability of being invited to manage the future project is larger when the 
committee project fails in period 1. Denote by s any effort by the chief to sabotage, undermine, or 
derail the committee’s project. He may achieve this, for example, by convincing fellow villagers 
not to work for the project, or by denying complementary resources under his control (including 
land). As before, we assume the villagers are unhappy about anti-social behavior of the chief, and 
that they are better able to express their unhappiness (at some cost c(ˑ) to the chief) when the 
chief is not powerful.  This results in the following maximization problem for the chief: 
 Max 𝑉𝑉 = −𝑐𝑐(𝑠𝑠; 𝜏𝜏) + 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠)𝜋𝜋∗ + (1 − 𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠))𝜋𝜋�.    (6) 
The first-order solution reads as  
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 −𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
+ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
(𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜋𝜋�) = 0,      (7) 
So that, from the total differential, it follows that: 
 𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕
= � 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
� �
−𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
+ 𝜕𝜕2𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2
(𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝜋𝜋�)��  > 0.     (8) 
In words: more powerful chiefs will behave worse, and try harder to sabotage the committee’s 
project. The intuition, again, is that they are insulated from unhappy responses from disgruntled 
villagers. The theory thus predicts that, as chiefs are more powerful, the probability of project 
success unambiguously goes down when the committee is managing the project. The same is not 
true for cases where the chief is the manager (equation 5). 
Note that our simple model does not produce an ex ante prediction of the expected 
performance of the chief versus the committee. This can be easily illustrated as follows. Assume 
that performance in case the chief is the manager is given by a function Zchief = Z(e*,α*;τ,E), 
where e* and α* follow from (2) and (3). Performance in case the committee manages the project 
is given by Zcommittee = Z(q*;s*,Q). It is immediately clear that Zchief – Zcommittee cannot be signed: 
(i) effort levels and management experience are different across treatments, (ii) input diversion 
rates may be different, and (iii) sabotage will adversely affect performance in the committee case. 
The net effect will depend on specific functional forms.  
To sum up, the model predicts that more powerful chiefs will (i) divert more project 
resources and (ii) work harder to undermine the performance of the committee. These 
unambiguous predictions speak to non-experimental outcomes. In contrast, we obtain an 
ambiguous prediction for the relative performance of the chief vis-à-vis the committee in our 
experiment. This comparison is complicated by various opposing effects, and ultimately an 
empirical matter.  
 
